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Abstract
Electronic commerce (a.k.a. E-commerce) systems such as eBay and Taobao of Alibaba are becoming
increasingly popular. Having an effective reputation system is critical to this type of internet service
because it can assist buyers to evaluate the trustworthiness of sellers, and it can also improve the revenue
for reputable sellers and E-commerce operators. We formulate a stochastic model to analyze an eBay-like
reputation system and propose four measures to quantify its effectiveness: (1) new seller ramp up time, (2)
new seller drop out probability, (3) long term profit gains for sellers, and (4) average per seller transaction
gains for the E-commerce operator. Through our analysis, we identify key factors which influence these
four measures. We propose a new insurance mechanism which consists of an insurance protocol and a
transaction mechanism to improve the above four measures. We show that our insurance mechanism can
reduce the ramp up time by around 87.2%, and guarantee new sellers ramp up before the deadline Tw
with a high probability (close to 1.0). It also increases the long term profit gains and average per seller
transaction gains by at least 95.3%.
1 Introduction
E-commerce systems are becoming increasingly popular and typical examples include eBay[9], Amazon[1],
and Taobao [22] of Alibaba (the largest E-commerce system in China), etc. Through an E-commerce system,
geographically distributed sellers and buyers can transact online. Sellers advertise products in their online
stores (which reside in the E-commerce’s website), while buyers can purchase products from any online
stores. The E-commerce system charges a transaction fee from sellers for each completed transaction. In an
E-commerce system, it is possible to purchase products from a seller whom the buyer has never transacted
with, and this seller may not even be trustworthy[19]. This situation results in a high risk of buying low
quality products. To overcome such problems, E-commerce systems deploy reputation systems[19].
Usually, E-commerce operators maintain and operate a reputation mechanism to reflect the trustworthi-
ness of sellers[9, 22]. A high reputation seller can attract more transactions leading to higher revenue[19].
The eBay-like reputation system is the most widely deployed reputation policy, which is used in eBay and
Tabao, etc. This type of reputation system is a credit based system. More precisely, a seller needs to collect
enough credits from buyers in order to improve his reputation. These credits are obtained in form of feedback
ratings, which are expressed by buyers after each transaction. Feedback ratings in eBay and Taobao are of
three levels: positive (+1), neutral (0), and negative (−1). The cumulative sum of all the past feedback
ratings (i.e., reputation score) reflects the trustworthiness of a seller. The reputation score and feedback
ratings are public information and accessible by all buyers and sellers in such an E-commerce system.
Consider this eBay-like reputation system, a new seller may spend a long time to collect enough credits
(i.e., ramp up). This is because new sellers are initialized with a reputation score of zero, and buyers are
less willing to buy products from a seller with low reputation scores. The ramp up time is critical to the
effectiveness of a reputation system. A long ramp up time discourages new sellers to join an E-commerce
system. Furthermore, a new user starts an online store with certain budgets, and maintaining such online
stores involves cost. If a new seller uses up his entire budget and has not yet ramped up his reputation,
he may discontinue his online business (i.e, or drops out) due to low revenue. Therefore, a long ramp up
time increases the risk that a new seller drops out and discourages potential new sellers to join. Finally, a
long ramp up time also results in a low profit gain for a seller. Because before ramping up, a seller can only
attract few transactions due to his low reputation score. To an E-commerce operator, this also results in an
indirect loss on transaction gains. This paper aims to identify key factors that influence the ramp up time
and to design a mechanism to improve this measure.
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Reducing ramp up time is challenging and to the best of our knowledge, this is the first work which
explores how to reduce the ramp up time for an eBay-like reputation system. This paper aims to explore
the following fundamental questions: (1) How to identify key factors which influence the ramp up time? (2)
How to take advantage of these factors to reduce the ramp up time? Our contributions are
• We propose four performance measures to quantify the effectiveness of eBay reputation systems: (1)
new seller ramp up time, (2) new seller drop out probability, (3) long term profit gains for sellers, and
(4) average per seller transaction gains for an E-commerce operator.
• We develop a stochastic model to identify key factors which many influence these four measures.
Through we gain important insights on how to design a new mechanism these performance measures.
• We propose and design an insurance mechanism which can reduce the ramp up time and the new seller
drop out probability. We show that our insurance mechanism can reduce the ramp up time by around
87.2%, and guarantee new sellers ramp up before the deadline Tw with a high probability (close to 1.0).
It also increases the long term profit gains and average per seller transaction gains by at least 95.3%.
This paper organizes as follows. In §2, we present the system model for E-commerce systems. In §3
we formulate four measures to explore the ramp up time problem, i.e., ramp up time, new seller drop out
probability, long term profit gains and average per seller transaction gains. In §4, we derive analytical
expressions for these four measures. In §5 present the design of our insurance mechanism. Related work is
given in §6 and we conclude in §7.
2 E-commerce System Model
An E-commerce system consists of users, products and a reputation system. A user can be a seller or a
buyer or both. Sellers advertise products in their online stores and set a price for each product. Buyers,
on the other hand, purchase products through online stores and provide feedbacks to indicate whether a
buyer advertises products honestly or not. A reputation system is maintained by E-commerce operators to
reflect the trustworthiness of sellers. A high reputation seller can attract more transactions leading to a high
revenue. The reputation system aggregates all the feedbacks, and computes a reputation score for each seller.
The reputation score is public information which is accessible by all buyers and sellers.
Products are categorized into different types. For example, eBay categorizes products into “Fashion”,
“Electronics”, “Collectibles & Art”, etc [9]. We consider L ≥ 1 types of product. Consider a type ℓ ∈
{1, . . . , L} product. A seller sets a price pℓ ∈ [0, 1] and the E-commerce operator charges a transaction fee of
T , αpℓ, where α ∈ (0, 1), after the product is sold
1. It has a manufacturing cost of cℓ∈ [0, 1]. A seller earns
a profit of uℓ by selling one product, we have
uℓ=(1− α)pℓ − cℓ. (1)
For the ease of presentation, our analysis focuses on one product type. It can be easily generalized to multiple
product types, and we omit the subscript unless we state otherwise.
2.1 Transaction Model
Sellers advertise the product quality in their online stores. Let Qa∈ [0, 1] be the advertised quality. The larger
the value of Qa implies the higher the advertised quality. Buyers refer to the advertised quality Qa in their
product adoption. Each online store also has an intrinsic quality. Let Qi∈ [0, 1] be the intrinsic quality (i.e.,
the ground truth of the product’s quality). The larger the value of Qi implies the higher the intrinsic quality.
Since sellers aim to promote their products, so we have Qa≥Qi. We emphasize that the intrinsic quality Qi
is private information, e.g., it is only known to the seller. On the other hand, the advertised quality Qa is
public information which is accessible by all buyers and sellers.
Buyers estimate the product quality by referring to the advertised quality Qa (we will present the esti-
mating model later). Let Qe ∈ [0, 1] be the estimated quality. The larger the value of Qe implies the higher
the estimated quality. To purchase a product, a buyer must submit a payment p to the E-commerce system,
which will be given to the corresponding seller when he receives the product. There is usually a shipment
delay in any E-commerce systems. We denote the delay as d. Upon receiving a product, a buyer can evaluate
its quality and at that moment, he has the perceived quality, which we denote as Qp ∈ [0, 1]. The larger
the value of Qp implies the higher the perceived quality. We assume that buyers can perceive the intrinsic
1We can also consider a fixed transaction fee model and our analysis is still applicable. But for brevity, let us consider a
transaction fee which is proportional to the selling price.
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quality, i.e., Qp=Qi. Buyers are satisfied (disappointed) if they find out that the product is at least as good
as (less than) it is advertised, or Qp≥Qa (Qp < Qa).
To attract buyers, an E-commerce system needs to incentivize sellers to advertise honestly, i.e., Qa=Qi.
Many E-commerce systems achieve this by deploying a reputation system. We next introduce a popular
reputation system used by many E-commerce systems such as eBay [9] or Taobao [22]. Table 1 summarizes
key notations in this paper.
p, c price and manufacturing cost of a product
T, u transaction fee, unit profit of selling a product
Qa, Qi, Qe, Qp advertised, intrinsic, estimated, perceived product quality
d, CS shipment delay, shipment cost
γ critical factor in expressing feedback ratings
F reputation profile for a seller
r reputation score for a seller
rh, θ reputation threshold, consistency threshold
β discounting factor in estimating product quality
P(Qe, p)
probability that a buyer buys a product with
an estimated quality quality Qe and a price p
Pba, Pbr
probability that a buyer buys a product from a seller
labelled as average (reputable)
λ1(λ2) buyer’s arrival rate before (after) a seller ramps up
Tw
the maximum time that a seller
is willing to wait to get ramped up
Tr, Pd ramp up time, new seller drop out probability
Gs, Ge
long term expected profit gains for a seller, average per
seller transaction gains for the E-commerce operator
δ discount factor in the long term expected profit gains Gs
λT (τ) transaction’s arrival rate at time slot τ
CI , DI , Td, Tc insurance price, deposit, duration time and clearing time
D̂I insurance deposit threshold to revoke insurance certificate
λI transaction’s arrival rate to an insured seller
T Ir , P
I
r
ramp up time with insurance,
new seller drop out probability with insurance
GIs, G
I
e
long term expected profit gains with insurance,
average per seller transaction gains with insurance
Table 1: Notation list
2.2 Baseline Reputation System
The eBay-like system maintains a reputation system to reflect the trustworthiness of sellers. It consists of a
feedback rating system and a rating aggregation policy.
Buyers express feedback ratings to indicate whether a seller advertises honestly or not. The eBay-like
system adopts a feedback rating system consisting of three rating points2, i.e., {−1, 0, 1}. A positive rating
(rating 1) indicates that a product is at least as good as it is advertised, i.e., Qp ≥ Qa. A neutral rating
(rating 0) indicates that a buyer is indifferent about the product that he purchased. This happens when the
perceived quality is slightly lower than it is advertised, i.e., Qp ∈ [Qa − γ,Qa), where γ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the
critical factor. The smaller the value of γ implies that buyers are more critical in expressing ratings, e.g.,
γ = 0 means that buyers have zero tolerance on seller overstating the product quality. A negative rating
(rating −1) represents that the perceived quality is far smaller than the advertised quality, i.e., Qp<Qa− γ.
We have
feedback rating =

1, if Qp ≥ Qa,
0, if Qa − γ ≤ Qp < Qa,
− 1, if Qp < Qa − γ.
All the historical ratings are known to all buyers and sellers.
2We can easily generalize the model to consider more rating points.
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For the rating aggregation policy, each seller is associated with a reputation score, which is the summation
of all his feedback ratings. We denote it by r ∈ Z. A new seller who enters the E-commerce system is initialized
with zero reputation score, or r = 0. A positive feedback rating increases r by one, a negative feedback rating
decreases r by one, and a neutral feedback rating 0 does not change r. Figure 1 depicts the transition diagram
of a seller’s reputation score. Note that r is a public information accessible by all buyers and sellers.
To assist buyers to evaluate the trustworthiness of a seller, E-commerce systems not only announce the
seller’s reputation score r, but also his reputation profile. Let F , (r, n+, n0, n−) be the reputation profile,
where n+, n0, n− represent the cumulative number of feedback ratings equal to 1, 0,−1 respectively. Note that
this form of reputation is commonly deployed, say in eBay [9] and Taobao [22].
.!!.!!. .!!.!!.
1 1
-1 -1
0 0 0
r - 1 r r + 1
Figure 1: Transition diagram of a seller’s reputation score r
Shipment delay in real-world E-commerce systems usually results in certain delay in the reputation up-
date. To characterize the dynamics of a reputation updating process, we consider a discrete time system
and divide the time into slots, i.e., [0, d), [d, 2d), . . ., where d is the shipment delay. We refer to a time
slot τ ∈ N as [τd, (τ + 1)d). Let N(τ) be the number of products sold in the time slot τ . Suppose
N+(τ), N0(τ), N−(τ) of these transactions result in positive, neutral and negative feedbacks respectively. Let
F(τ), (r(τ), n+(τ), n0(τ), n−(τ)) be the reputation profile at time slot τ . Then we have F(0)= (0, 0, 0, 0).
We update the reputation profile F(τ) as
n+(τ + 1) = n+(τ) +N+(τ),
n0(τ + 1) = n0(τ) +N0(τ),
n−(τ + 1) = n−(τ) +N−(τ),
r(τ + 1) = r(τ) +N+(τ)−N−(τ).
(2)
For simplicity, we drop the time stamp τ in the reputation profile, when no confusion involved.
We next present a model to characterize the impact of sellers’ reputation profiles on buyers’ product
adoption behavior. This model serves as an important building block to explore the effectiveness of this
baseline reputation system.
2.3 Model for Product Adoption Behavior
The reputation system forges trust among sellers and buyers. This trust plays a critical role in product
adoption. More precisely, buyers evaluate the trustworthiness of sellers from sellers’ reputation profiles.
Buyers seek to minimize the risk in product purchase and they prefer to buy from reputable sellers.
Based on the reputation profile F , our model classifies sellers into two types: “reputable” and “average”.
To be labeled as reputable, a seller’s reputation profile must satisfy two conditions. The first one is that
a seller needs to collect enough credits, i.e., positive feedbacks from buyers. More precisely, his reputation
score must be at least greater than or equal to some positive reputation threshold rh, i.e., r ≥ rh. A new
seller is initialized with zero reputation score, i.e., r = 0. To accumulate a reputation score of at least rh,
he needs to accomplish enough number of honest transactions. The second condition is that a seller should
be consistently honest. More concretely, the fraction of positive feedbacks should be larger than or equal to
a consistency threshold θ ∈ (0, 1], i.e., n+/(n+ + n− + n0) ≥ θ. The larger the value of θ implies that the
E-Commerce operators are more critical about the honest consistency. We formally define a reputable seller
and an average seller as follows.
Definition 2.1. A seller is labeled as reputable if and only if the follwing two conditions are met
C1: r ≥ rh and,
C2: n+/(n+ + n− + n0) ≥ θ.
Otherwise, a seller is labeled as an average seller.
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Hence, the reputation threshold rh and consistency threshold θ quantify how difficult is it to earn a reputable
label. The larger the rh and θ, the more difficult it is to earn a reputable label.
A buyer estimates the product quality referring to the advertised quality Qa and the reputation profile
of a seller. More concretely, if a seller’s reputation profile indicates that this seller is reputable, then a
buyer believes that this seller advertises honestly. This buyer therefore estimates the product quality as the
advertised quality, i.e., Qe=Qa. On the contrary, if the reputation profile indicates that a seller is average, a
buyer believes that this seller is likely to overstate the product quality. Hence the estimated quality is lower
than the advertised quality, i.e., Qe=βQa, where β ∈ [0, 1] denotes the discounting factor. The smaller the
value of β implies that buyers are less willing to trust an average seller. We have
Qe =
{
Qa, if r ≥ rh and n
+/(n+ + n− + n0) ≥ θ,
βQa, otherwise.
A buyer makes the purchasing decision based on the estimated quality Qe and the product price p. More
concretely, the probability that a buyer buys a product increases in Qe and decreases in p. Formally, we have
Pr[adopts a product] , P (Qe, p) , (3)
where the function P increases in Qe and decreases in p.
In the following section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the baseline reputation system in E-commerce
applications. Our goal is to identify key factors that influence the effectiveness of this reputation system and
if possible, improve it.
3 Problems Formulation
We propose four performance measures to quantify the effectiveness of the baseline reputation system men-
tioned in Section 2. These measures are: (1) ramp up time Tr, (2) new seller drop out probability Pd, (3) long
term expected profit gains for a seller Gs, and (4) average per seller transaction gains for the E-commerce
system operator Ge. We also present our problem formulations and our objective is to identify key factors
which can influence these measures. Lastly, we raise an interesting question of whether there are other mech-
anisms which can reduce the ramp up time and the new seller drop out probability, and improve the long
term expected profit gains and average per seller transaction gains.
3.1 Ramp Up Time
Sellers and E-commerce system operators are interested in the minimum time that a new seller must spend
to collect enough credits, i.e., positive feedbacks from buyers, so that the seller can be classified as reputable.
For one thing, a reputable seller can attract more buyers which may result in more transactions, and higher
transaction volume implies higher transaction gains to the E-commerce operator. We next formally define
the ramp up process and the ramp up condition.
Definition 3.1. A new seller’s reputation is r=0. He needs to collect enough credits, i.e., positive feedbacks
from buyers, so that his reputation r can increase to at least rh. The process of increasing his reputation
to rh is called the ramp up process. Furthermore, when r ≥ rh, then we say that the ramp up condition is
satisfied.
Recall that r(τ) denotes the reputation score of a seller at time slot τ . We formally define the ramp up
time as follows.
Definition 3.2. Ramp up time is the minimum time that a seller must spend to accumulate a reputation
score of rh. Let Tr denote the ramp up time, we have
Tr , d · argmin
τ
{r(τ) ≥ rh}. (4)
The ramp up time quantifies how long it will take to collect enough credits from buyers. It is critical to the
profit gains for a seller. To see this, we next quantify how the ramp up time can affect the transaction’s
arrival rate.
A seller can attract more buyers when he satisfies the ramp up condition because his online store will
receive higher click rate by buyers, therefore increasing his profit gains. Let λ1 (λ2) be the buyer’s arrival
rate before (after) a seller satisfies the ramp up condition. We assume that the buyer’s arrival process, either
before or after a seller satisfies the ramp up condition, follows a Poisson counting process with parameter
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λ1 (before ramping up) and λ2 (after ramping up) respectively, where λ1<λ2 to signify that a ramped up
seller can attract more buyers. Recall that in Equation (3) we express the probability that a buyer adopts
a product as P(Qe, p). If a buyer adopts a product, we say a seller obtains a transaction. Based on the
Poisson property, it is easy to see that the transaction’s arrival process is also a Poisson counting process.
Let λT (τ) be the transaction’s arrival rate at time slot τ . Let P(Qe(τ), p) be the probability that a buyer
adopts a product at time slot τ , where Qe(τ) denotes the estimated quality at time slot τ . We can express
the transaction’s arrival rate as
λT (τ) =
{
λ1P(Qe(τ), p), if r(τ) < rh,
λ2P(Qe(τ), p), if r(τ)≥rh ,
. (5)
Equation (5) serves as an important building block for us to explore the key factors which influence the ramp
up time Tr. Let us formulate our first problem.
Problem 1: Identify key factors which influence the ramp up time Tr, and design a mechanism which can
take advantage of these factors to reduce Tr.
3.2 New Seller Drop Out Probability
In real-world E-commerce systems, a new seller may drop out, or move to another E-commerce system,
if he does not collect enough credits (i.e., ramp up) within certain time because he cannot obtain enough
transactions. For example, a new seller in eBay may drop out if he does not ramp up in one year. This is
because a new seller starts an online store with certain budgets and there are costs associated with maintaining
this online business. Let Tw > 0 denote the maximum time that a new seller is willing to wait to get ramped
up. In other words, if the ramp up time is longer than Tw, a new seller will quit or drop out from that
E-commerce system. We assume Tw/d ∈ N to accommodate the delay (d) in reputation update.
Definition 3.3. A new seller drops out, if and only if Tr>Tw.
Sellers and the E-commerce operator are interested in this new seller drop out probability. Let
Pd , Pr[Tr > Tw] (6)
denote the probability that a new seller drops out. The smaller the value of Pd implies that sellers are more
likely to continue his online business in the E-commerce system. This is an important measure since a small
Pd can attract more new sellers to join the E-commerce system, which will result in higher transaction gains
for the E-commerce operator. On the other hand, a large Pd discourages new sellers to participate and can
reduce the transaction gains for the E-commerce operator. We therefore consider the second problem.
Problem 2: Identify key factors which influence the new seller drop out probability Pd, and design a mech-
anism which can take advantage of these factors to reduce Pd.
3.3 Long Term Profit Gains and Transaction Gains
The profit gain (transaction gain) is critical to sellers (E-commerce system operators). We focus on the
scenario that sellers are long lived and they aim to maximize their long term profit gains. Recall that u, the
unit profit of selling one product, is expressed in Equation (1). Also recall that N(τ) denotes the number
of products sold in the time slot τ . We emphasize that N(τ) is a random variable and follows a Poisson
distribution with parameter λT (τ)d, where λT (τ) is derived in Equation (5). A seller earns a profit of uN(τ)
in the time slot τ . We consider a discounted long term profit gain with a discounting factor of δ ∈ (0, 1]. Let
Gs denote the long term expected profit gains for a seller. We express it as
Gs , E
[
∞∑
τ=0
δτuN(τ)
]
. (7)
Note that when a seller earns a profit u, he also contributes a transaction fee T = αp to the E-commerce
operator. Let Ge denote the average per seller transaction gains that a seller pays to the E-commerce operator.
We can express it as
Ge,E
[
∞∑
τ=0
δτTN(τ)
]
=E
[
∞∑
τ=0
δταpN(τ)
]
=
αp
u
Gs. (8)
Note that Gs is important to a seller while Ge is important to the E-commerce operator. We consider the
following problem.
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Problem 3: Identify key factors which influence the profit gains Gs and average per seller transaction gains
Ge, and design a mechanism to use these factors to improve Ge and Gs.
We next derive E[Tr], Pd, Gs, and Ge. Through this analysis, we identify key factors which influence
the above mentioned performance measures. These insights will serve as important building blocks for us to
design a mechanism.
4 Analyzing the Baseline Reputation System
We derive analytical expressions for the expected ramp up time (E[Tr]), the new seller drop out probability
(Pd), the long term expected profit gains (Ge) and the average per seller transaction gains (Ge). Through
this we identify that the reputation threshold (rh), as well as the probability that a buyer buys a product
from an “average labeled” seller (Pab) are two critical factors which influence Tr, Pd, Gs and Ge. Our results
indicates that the baseline reputation mechanism described in Section 2, suffers from long ramp up time,
high new seller drop out probability, and small long term profit gains or transaction gains. These insights
show that one need to have a new mechanism to reduce Tr, Pd, and to improve Gs and Ge. We will present
this new mechanism in Section 5.
4.1 Deriving the Expected Ramp Up Time E[Tr]
Let us derive the analytical expression for the expected ramp up time E[Tr]. This measure quantifies on
average, how long it will take to ramp up a new seller under the baseline reputation mechanism mentioned
in Section 2. We consider the scenario that buyers advertise the product quality honestly, i.e., Qa=Qi. As
to how an eBay-like reputation mechanism can guarantee rational sellers to advertise honestly, one can refer
to [8]. We like to point out that new sellers can achieve the lowest ramp up time by advertising honestly
(Qa=Qi). Hence, the assumption that Qa=Qi can be viewed as deriving the best case of Tr for the baseline
reputation system. Let us first define the following notations.
Definition 4.1. Let Pba,P(βQi, p) and Pbr ,P(Qi, p) denote the probability that a buyer buys a product
from an “average labeled” seller and a “reputable” seller respectively.
In the following theorem, we state the expected ramp up time.
Theorem 4.1. The expected ramp up time is
E[Tr] = d
∞∑
τ=1
(
1−
∞∑
k=rh
e−λ1Pba(τ−1)d
(λ1Pba(τ − 1)d)
k
k!
)
.
The E[Tr] increases in the reputation threshold rh, and decreases in the transaction’s arrival rate λ1Pba.
Proof: Please refer to the appendix for derivation.
Remark: Theorem 4.1 states that a new seller is more difficult to get ramped up if the E-Commerce operator
sets a high reputation threshold rh, or the transaction’s arrival rate to an “average labeled” seller (λ1Pba) is
low.
Table 2 presents numerical examples on the expected ramp up time E[Tr], where we fix Pba=0.02, i.e.,
buyers buy products from an “average labeled” seller with probability 0.02, and fix d=3, i.e., it takes three
days to ship a product to a buyer (or for the E-commerce operator to update sellers’ reputation). We vary
the buyer’s arrival rate λ1 from 5 to 25, i.e., on average each day an “average labeled” seller attracts 5 to 25
buyers to visit his online store. We vary the reputation threshold (rh) from 100 to 200. When rh=200, as
λ1 increases from 5 to 25, the expected ramp up time (E[Tr]) drops from 2001.7 to 401.6 days, a deduction
ratio of 80%. When the buyer’s arrival rate is low, say λ1=5, as the reputation threshold rh drops from 200
to 100, the expected ramp up time E[Tr] drops from 2001.7 to 1001.4 days, a reduction ratio of 50%. These
results indicates that the expected ramp up time (E[Tr]) is large in general. Namely, it is difficult for new
sellers to quickly get ramped up under the baseline reputation system. We next explore the new seller drop
out probability.
4.2 Deriving the New Seller Drop Out Probability Pd
We now derive the analytical expression for Pd. This probability quantifies how difficult it is for a new seller
to survive in the E-commerce system. Note that Pd is also crucial for new sellers to decide whether or not to
open an online store in an E-commerce system. Namely, a low drop out probability Pd is attractive to new
sellers, while a high Pd discourages new sellers to join.
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λ1 5 10 15 20 25
E[Tr] (rh=200) 2001.7 1001.4 668.2 501.5 401.6
E[Tr] (rh=150) 1501.4 751.5 501.5 376.5 301.5
E[Tr] (rh=100) 1001.4 501.5 334.8 251.5 201.5
Table 2: Expected ramp up time E[Tr] in days (Pba = 0.02, d=3).
Theorem 4.2. The new seller drop out probability is
Pd =
rh−1∑
k=0
e−λ1PbaTw
(λ1PbaTw)
k
k!
.
The Pd decreases in λ1Pba, Tw and increases in rh.
Proof: Please refer to the appendix for derivation.
Remark: Theorem 4.2 states that a new seller can reduces the drop out probability by extending his ramp
up deadline line (Tw), and a new seller is more likely to drop out if the reputation threshold (rh) increases
or the transaction’s arrival rate to an “average labeled” seller (λ1Pba) decreases.
Table 3 presents numerical examples on the new seller drop out probability Pd, where we set λ1 = 20, i.e.,
on average, each day an “average labeled” seller attracts 20 buyers to visit his store, d=3, and Tw=180, i.e.,
sellers drops out if they do not ramp up in 180 days. We vary Pba, the probability that a buyer buys products
from an “average labeled” seller, from 0.01 to 0.05, and vary the reputation threshold rh from 100 to 200.
Consider rh=200. As Pba increases from 0.01 to 0.05, the new seller drop out probability Pd decreases from
1 to 0.92514. This implies a very high drop out probability. Consider Pba=0.03. As the reputation threshold
rh drops from 200 to 100, we see that Pd drops from 1 to 0.20819, a reduction ratio of around 80%. It is
interesting to observe that when the Pba is small, the new seller drop out probability is quite high. In fact
when Pba=0.01, Pd is very close to 1. In other words, if buyers are less willing to buy from “average labeled”
sellers, new sellers will be more likely to drop out. We next explore key factors which influence long term
expected profit gains and average per seller transaction gains.
Pba 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
Pd (rh = 200) 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 0.99999 0.92514
Pd (rh = 150) 1.00000 1.00000 0.99992 0.68056 0.00991
Pd (rh = 100) 1.00000 0.99897 0.20819 0.00005 0.00000
Table 3: New seller drop out probability Pd (λ1 = 20, Tw=180, d=3).
4.3 Deriving the Long Term Profit Gains Gs and Ge
Let us now derive analytical expressions for the long term expected profit gains Gs and the average per seller
transaction gains Ge respectively. They are important measures because a large Gs is attractive to new
sellers and a small Gs discourages new sellers to join the E-commerce system, while the average per seller
transaction gains Ge is crucial to the E-commerce system operator.
Theorem 4.3. The long term expected profit gains for a new seller can be expressed as
Gs =
rh−1∑
k=0
(λ1PbaTw)
k
(k)!
e−λ1PbaTw
∫
. . .
∫
0<t1<...<tk<Tw
k!
T kw
k∑
j=1
u
δ⌈tj/d⌉dt1 . . . dtk +
∫ Tw
0
dtrh
∫
. . .
∫
0<t1<...<trh−1<trh
λ1Pbae
−λ1Pbatrh
(λ1Pbatrh)
rh−1
(rh − 1)!
(rh − 1)!
(trh)
rh−1
u
( rh∑
j=1
δ⌈tj/d⌉+λ2Pbrd
δ⌈trh/d⌉+1
1− δ
+ δ⌈trh/d⌉λ1Pba(d⌈trh/d⌉ − trh)
)
dt1 . . . dtrh−1.
Furthermore, Ge =
αp
u Gs.
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Proof: Please refer to the appendix for derivation.
Remark: Theorem 4.3 quantifies the impact of various factors on the long term expected profit gains (Gs)
and average per seller transaction gains (Ge), e.g., the reputation threshold rh, the buyer’s arrival rate λ1, λ2,
etc. However the analytical expressions are in complicated forms. It is hard to draw some insights on how
critical are these factors in influencing Gs and Ge by directly examining these expressions. We next present
some numerical examples to illustrate their impact.
Table 4 presents numerical examples on the long term expected profit gains (Gs) and the average per
seller transaction gains (Ge), where we set λ1 =20, T =αp=0.1, λ2 =50, u=1, Tw =180, d= 3, Pbr =0.1
(i.e., buyers buy products from a reputable seller with probability 0.1). We vary Pba, the probability that a
buyer purchases products from an “average labeled” seller, and the ramp up threshold rh to examine their
impact on Gs and Ge. Consider rh =200. As Pba increases from 0.01 to 0.05, Gs improves from 26.833 to
198.059, an improvement ratio of 6.38 time. Similarly, the average per seller transaction gains Ge is also
improved by 6.38 times. This implies that Pba is critical to both sellers’ profit gains and the E-commerce
system operator’s transaction gains. Consider Pba =0.05. As rh drops from 200 to 100, Gs improves from
198.059 to 1142.670, an improvement ratio of 4.77. This improvement ratio also holds for the average per
seller transaction grains Ge. It is interesting to observe that when Pba is small, both Gs and Ge are quite
small. In fact when Pba=0.01, the Gs is around 26.833 and Ge is around 2.6833. Namely, if buyers are less
willing to buy from “average labeled” sellers, sellers (E-commerce operators) will have low long term profit
gains (average per seller transaction gains).
Pba 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
Gs (rh=200) 26.833 53.342 80.705 107.312 198.059
Gs (rh=150) 26.980 53.594 80.812 369.951 1006.017
Gs (rh=100) 26.941 54.433 760.511 1054.507 1142.670
Ge (rh=200) 2.6833 5.3342 8.0705 10.7312 19.8059
Ge (rh=150) 2.6980 5.3594 8.0812 36.9951 100.6017
Ge (rh=100) 2.6941 5.4433 76.0511 105.4507 114.2670
Table 4: Long term expected profit gains Gs and average per seller transaction gains Ge (λ1 = 20, λ2 =
50, u = 1, T = αp = 0.1, δ = 0.99, Tw = 180, Pbr = 0.1, d = 3).
Summary: The reputation threshold rh and Pba are critical to the ramp up time, the new seller drop out
probability, the long term profit gains and the average per seller transaction gains. The baseline (or eBay-like)
reputation system presented in Section 2 suffers from long ramp up time, high seller drop out probability,
small long term profit gains and small average per seller transaction gains. Hence, it is important to ask
whether we can design a new mechanism that an E-commerce system can use to improve all the performance
measures E[Tr], Pd, Gs and Ge. We next explore this interesting question.
5 Insurance Mechanism
In the previous section, we showed that the baseline reputation system is not efficient. Here, we present a
new approach which we call the “insurance mechanism” to reduce both the expected ramp up time (E[Tr])
and new seller drop out probability (Pd), and to improve the long term expected profit gains (Gs) and
the average per seller transaction gains (Ge). We also quantify the impact of our insurance mechanism on
E[Tr], Pd, Gs and Ge. We show that our insurance mechanism can reduce the ramp up time by around
87.2%, and guarantee new sellers ramp up before the deadline Tw with a high probability (close to 1.0). It
also increases the long term profit gains and average per seller transaction gains by at least 95.3%.
5.1 Insurance Mechanism Design
The objective of our insurance mechanism is to help new sellers ramp up quickly. Reducing ramp up time
brings the benefit of reducing new seller drop out probability and improving long term expected profit gains
and average per seller transaction gains (Gs and Ge). Our insurance mechanism consists of an insurance
protocol and a transaction mechanism.
We first describe the insurance protocol. The E-commerce system operator provides an insurance service
to new sellers. Each insurance has a price of CI>0, a duration time of Td>0, and a clearing time of Tc>0.
The insurance clearing time takes effect when an insurance expires. To buy an insurance, a seller must
provide the E-commerce operator an insurance deposit of DI . Hence, the total payment by the new seller
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to the E-commerce system operator is CI +DI . We refer to this insurance as the (CI , Td, Tc, DI)-insurance.
Only new sellers can subscribe to this insurance. If a seller subscribes an insurance, the E-commerce system
operator issues an insurance certificate to him, and this certificate is known to the public (i.e., all buyers
and sellers). This certificate only takes effect within the insurance duration time Td. The E-commerce
system operator treats a seller with an insurance certificate as trustworthy. To guarantee that such sellers
will advertise their product quality honestly, the E-commerce system operator requires such sellers obey the
following transaction mechanism.
We now describe the transaction mechanism. Only sellers with an insurance certificate must obey this
transaction mechanism. Let us focus on a seller with an insurance certificate. When ordering a product from
this seller, a buyer sends his payment p to the E-commerce system operator. After receiving the product, if this
buyer express a positive feedback, then this transaction completes, i.e., the E-commerce operator forwards
the payment (1 − α)p to the seller and charges a transaction fee of αp. This transaction also completes
if this buyer expresses a neutral feedback. A neutral feedback means that a seller slightly overstated his
product quality, i.e. Qi < Qa < Qi + γ. To avoid such overstating, the E-commerce company revokes a
seller’s insurance certificate once the fraction of positive feedbacks falls below the consistency factor (θ), i.e.,
n+/(n+ + n0 + n−) < θ. A negative feedback results in the transaction being revoked. More concretely, the
E-commerce operator gives the payment p back to the buyer and does not charge any transaction fee from
the seller (provided that it is within the duration time Td, or the clearing time Tc). The buyer needs to
ship the product back to the seller but the buyer does not need to pay for the shipment cost CS , for it will
be deducted from a seller’s insurance deposit DI . If the insurance deposit is not enough to cover CS , the
E-commerce operator makes a supplemental payment. To avoid this undesirable outcome, the E-commerce
company revokes a seller’s insurance certificate, once a seller’s deposit reaches a threshold D̂I < DI . The
insurance clearing time takes effect when an insurance is invoked. At the end of the clearing time, the
E-commerce company returns the remaining deposit of DI (if it is not deducted to zero) back to the seller.
Remark. Sellers may collude with buyers to inflate their reputation by fake transactions [10]. One way to
avoid such collusion is by increasing the transaction fee such as [2]. The shipment cost may exceed DI due to
a large number of products to be returned. This can be avoided with high probability by setting a large D̂I
(Theorem 5.2). We also derive the minimum clearing time (Tc) to guarantee that a seller with an insurance
certificate needs to obey the transaction mechanism (Theorem 5.2).
5.2 Analyzing the Insurance Mechanism
We first show that buyers treat a seller having an insurance certificate as trustworthy. Through this, we
derive the transaction rate that a seller with an insurance certificate can attract. We then derive the improved
E[Tr], Pd, Gs and Ge.
Buyers treat sellers having an insurance certificate as trustworthy. This is an important property of
our insurance mechanism because it influences the probability that a buyer adopts a product from a seller.
Suppose in time slot τ , a seller has an insurance certificate. If this seller advertise honestly Qa =Qi, then
the buyer who buys a product from this seller will be satisfied (express positive feedback rating). In this
case, the payment from the buyer will be forwarded to the seller. Hence this seller earns a profit of u. If
this seller overstates his product quality beyond the lenient factor (γ), i.e., Qa>Qi + γ. Then according to
our insurance mechanism, the payment by the buyer will be returned back to the buyer. The seller needs
to pay a shipment cost of CS to ship back the product and CS will be deducted from his insurance deposit
DI . Hence, if a seller overstates the product quality beyond the lenient factor, he will lose a total shipment
cost of at least min{D̂I , CSN(τ)} in time slot τ , where N(τ) denotes the number of product selling. A seller
with an insurance certificate must obey the same consistency factor (θ) as reputable sellers in being honest,
i.e., n+/(n+ + n0 + n−) ≥ θ, because if not his insurance certificate will be revoked by the E-commerce
operator. Given these properties, buyers trust a seller with an insurance certificate. Recall that the E-
commerce operator also trusts a seller with an insurance certificate. Therefore, an insured seller can attract
transactions with an arrival rate being equivalent to those reputable sellers. Let λIT denote the transaction’s
arrival rate to a seller with an insurance certificate. We have
λIT =λ2Pbr. (9)
We now quantify the impact of our insurance mechanism on the four performance measures. Let
T Ir , P
I
d , G
I
s, G
I
e denote the ramp up time, the new seller drop out probability, the long term profit gains
and the average per seller transaction gains respectively, when a new seller subscribes our insurance.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose a new seller subscribes to our proposed insurance mechanism. We express the
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expected ramp up time and new seller drop out probability as
E[Tr] = d
∞∑
τ=1
(
1−
∞∑
k=rh
e−
∑τ−2
ℓ=0
λ˜T (ℓ)
(
∑τ−2
ℓ=0 λ˜T (ℓ))
k
k!
)
,
Pd =
rh−1∑
k=0
e−
∑Tw/d−1
ℓ=0 λ˜T (ℓ)
(
∑Tw/d−1
ℓ=0 λ˜T (ℓ))
k
k!
,
where λ˜T (ℓ)=λ2Pbrd for all ℓ=0, 1, . . . , ⌊Td/d⌋−1, and λ˜T (⌊Td/d⌋)=λ2Pbr(Td−d⌊Td/d⌋)+λ1Pba(d⌊Td/d⌋+
d− Td), and λ˜T (ℓ)=λ1Pbad for all ℓ=⌊Td/d⌋+1, . . . ,∞. The long term expected profit gains for an insured
seller is:
GIs =
rh−1∑
k=0
(λ2Pbrmin{Td, Tw})
k
k!
e−λ2Pbr min{Td,Tw}
∫
. . .
∫
0<t1<...<tk<min{Td,Tw}
k!dt1 . . . dtk
(min{Td, Tw})k
(
I{Td≥Tw}
k∑
j=1
uδ⌈tj/d⌉
+ I{Td<Tw}
rh−1−k∑
i=0
(λ1Pba(Tw − Td))
i
i!
e−λ1Pba(Tw−Td)
∫
. . .
∫
Td<tk+1<...<tk+i<Tw
i!
(Tw − Td)i
dtk+1 . . . tk+i
k+i∑
j=1
uδ⌈tj/d⌉
)
+
(
I{Td≥Tw}
∫ Tw
0
λ2Pbre
−λ2Pbrtrh
(λ2Pbrtrh)
rh−1
(rh − 1)!
dtrh∫
. . .
∫
0<t1<...<trh−1<trh
(rh − 1)!
(trh)
rh−1
dt1 . . . dtrh−1 + I{Td<Tw}
rh∑
k=0
(λ2PbrTd)
k
k!
e−λ2PbrTd
∫
. . .
∫
0<t1<...<tk<Td
k!
T kd
dt1 . . . dtk
∫ Tw
Td
λ1Pbae
−λ1Pba(trn−Td)
(λ1Pba(trn − Td))
rh−k−1
(rh − k − 1)!
dtrh∫
. . .
∫
Td<tk+1<...<trh−1<trh
(rh − k − 1)!dtk+1 . . . dtrh−1
(trh − Td)
rh−k−1
)
u
(
λ2dPbr
δ⌈trh/d⌉+1
1− δ
+
rh∑
j=1
δ⌈tj/d⌉ + δ⌈trh/d⌉λ2Pbr(d⌈trh/d⌉ − trh)
)
Furthermore, GIe =
αp
u G
I
s.
Proof: Please refer to the appendix for derivation.
Remark: Theorem 5.1 quantifies the impact of our insurance mechanism on the four important performance
measures. Before we talk more about how to select the insurance price CI and deposit DI , let us illustrate
the effectiveness of our insurance mechanism using some numerical examples.
Table 5 presents numerical examples on E[T Ir ], P
I
d , G
I
s and G
I
e . We use the following setting: λ1=20, λ2=
50, u= 1, Tw = 180, d= 3, Pbr = 0.1, Pba = 0.03, CI = 100, DI = 100, D̂I = 50, CS = 0.5, T = 0.1, Td = 100, Tc =
3, δ = 0.99. We also presents numerical examples on E[Tr], Pd, Gs and Ge for comparison studies. When
rh = 100, we have E[Tr] = 168.1 and E[T
I
r ] = 21.5. In other words, our insurance mechanism reduces the
expected ramp up time from 168.1 days to only 21.5 days, or over 87.2% reduction. It is interesting to
observe that our incentive mechanism reduces the new seller drop out probability from Pd = 0.20819 to
P Id = 0. Namely, our insurance mechanism can guarantee that new sellers ramps up before the deadline line
Tw with a high probability (very close to 1.0). In addition, our insurance mechanism improves long term
expected profit gains from Gs = 760.51 to G
I
s = 1485.04, a 95.3% improvement. This improvement ratio
also holds for average per seller transaction gains. As rh increases from 100 to 200, the improvement on the
E[Tr], Pd, Gs, Ge, becomes more significant. We next state the appropriate values for CI , DI , D̂I and Tc in
the following theorem.
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rh=100 rh=150 rh=200
(E[Tr], E[T
I
r ]) (168.1, 21.5) (251.6, 31.5) (334.9, 41.5)
(Pd, P
I
d ) (0.20819, 0) (0.99992, 0) (1.0, 0)
(Gs, G
I
s) (760.51, 1485.04) (80.81, 1485.03) (80.71, 1485.01)
(Ge, G
I
e) (76.051, 148.504) (8.081, 148.503) (8.071, 148.501)
Table 5: Impact of our insurance on E[Tr], Pd, Gs and Ge.
Theorem 5.2. An upper bound for the insurance price CI is CI < G
I
s −Gs. If DI and D̂I satisfies
DI > D̂I ≥ CS max{ln ǫ
−1 − λ2PbrTd, e
2λ2PbrTd},
then Pr[shipment cost exceeds DI ] ≤ ǫ. If Tc≥d, then all products sold by a seller with an insurance certificate
can be guaranteed to obey the insurance mechanism.
Proof: Please refer to the appendix for derivation.
Remark: The insurance price should be lower than GIs − Gs. The clearing time should be larger or equal
to d. To guarantee that the insurance deposit covers the shipment cost for returning products with high
probability, DI and D̂I need to be no less than CS max{ln ǫ
−1 − λ2PbrTd, e
2λ2PbrTd}.
6 Related Work
Research on reputation systems [19] for internet services has been quite active. Many aspects of reputation
systems have been studied, i.e., reputation metric formulation and calculation [11, 15, 20], attacks and defense
techniques for reputation systems [5, 10, 24, 23], and effectiveness of reputation systems [7]. A survey can be
found in [12].
Theoretical aspects of reputation system have been studied extensively. First, many works studied rep-
utation metric formulation and calculation. Two most representative reputation calculating models are the
eBay-like reputation model [11] and the transitive trust based model [5]. The eBay-like reputation system is
a typical example of reputation model which computes the reputation score by summarizing explicit human
feedbacks (or ratings) [3, 11, 21, 25]. The transitive trust based model [5, 6, 20, 15, 24] assumes that if user
A trusts user B and user B trusts user C, then user A trusts user C. More precisely, each user is represented
by a node in a graph, and the weighted directed link from A to B quantifies the degree that user A trusts
user B. For this model, many algorithms were developed to compute an overall reputation score for each
user [5, 6, 20, 15, 24]. These works provided theoretical foundations for reputation computing. Second,
many works explored attack and defense techniques for reputation systems. One type of potential attacks is
that users may not give honest feedbacks. Peer-prediction method based mechanisms were proposed to elicit
honest feedbacks [13, 14, 17]. Another type of potential attacks is reputation inflation, or self-promotion.
Many works have been done to address this issue [5, 10, 24, 23]. A survey on attack and defense techniques
for reputation systems can be found in [10]. The main difference between our work and theirs is that we
propose a new mechanism to improve eBay system.
The most closely related works are [2, 7, 8, 16], which studied the eBay reputation mechanism. Authors
in [2] derived the minimum transaction fee to avoid ballot stuffing (i.e., fake positive feedbacks). Authors
in [7] proposed an algorithm based on buyer friendship relationship to filter out unfair ratings. In [7], authors
explored the impact of buyers biases’ (i.e., leniency or criticality) in express feedback ratings on sellers in
advertising product quality. The impact of negative feedbacks on buyers in expressing feedback ratings was
studied in [16]. The difference between our work and theirs is that we propose a new mechanism to improve
eBay system.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents an Insurance mechanism to improve eBay-like reputation mechanisms. We proposed
four performance measures to analyze eBay reputation system: (1) new seller ramp up time, (2) new seller
drop out probability, (3) long term profit gains for sellers and (4) average per seller transaction gains for an
E-commerce operator. We developed a stochastic model to identify key factors which influence the above
four measures. We proposed an insurance mechanism to improve the above four measures. We show that
our insurance mechanism can reduce the ramp up time by around 87.2%, and guarantee new sellers ramp up
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before the deadline Tw with a high probability (close to 1.0). It also increases the long term profit gains and
average per seller transaction gains by at least 95.3%.
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Appendix
We first state a lemma which will be used in our proof.
Lemma 7.1 ([4]). Let {N ′(t), t ≥ 0} denote a Poisson process with a rate parameter λ. Let tk denote the
arrival time of k-th event. Let f(t1, . . . , tn|N
′(t′) = n) denote the conditional probability density function of
t1, . . . , tn given N
′(t′) = n. Then we have f(t1, . . . , tn|N
′(t′) = n) = n!/(t′)n, where 0 < t1 < . . . < tn < t
′.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: Note that each new seller advertise product quality honestly. In this scenario, each
transaction results in one positive feedback. Recall our reputation updating rule specified in Equation (2), we
have that the reputation score at time slot τ equals the number of transactions arriving within time slot 0 to
time slot τ − 1. Recall the definition of Tr in Equation (4), we have that Tr/d ∈ N. With these observations
and by some basic probability arguments, we have
E[Tr] =
∞∑
τ=1
τdPr[Tr = τd] = d
∞∑
τ=1
τ Pr[Tr/d = τ ]
= d
∞∑
τ=1
Pr[Tr/d ≥ τ ] = d
∞∑
τ=1
(1− Pr[Tr/d ≤ (τ − 1)])
= d
∞∑
τ=1
(1 − Pr[r(τ − 1) ≥ rh]) = d
∞∑
τ=1
(
1−
τ−2∑
ℓ=0
N(ℓ)≥rh
)
.
Note that
∑τ−2
ℓ=0 N(ℓ) is a random variable which follows a Poisson distribution with parameter λ1Pba(τ−1)d.
We have
E[Tr] = d
∞∑
τ=1
(1−
∞∑
k=rh
e−λ1Pba(τ−1)d
(λ1Pba(τ − 1)d)
k
k!
).
Evaluating the first order derivative on E[Tr] with respect to rh and λ1Pba respectively, one can easily obtain
the monotonous property of E[Tr].
Proof of Theorem 4.2: Applying similar derivation as Theorem 4.1, we have that the reputation score
at time slot τ equals the number of transactions arriving within time slot 0 to τ − 1. Note that Tw/d ∈ N.
Recall the definition in Equation (4) we have that Tr > Tw if and only if r(Tw/d) < rh. Using some basic
probability arguments, we have
Pd=Pr[r(Tw/d) < rh]=Pr
[∑Tw/d−1
τ=0
N(τ) < rh
]
.
Note that
∑Tw/d−1
τ=0 N(τ) is a random variable which follows a Poisson distribution with parameter λ1PbaTw.
We have
Pd=
rh−1∑
k=0
Pr
Tw/d−1∑
τ=0
N(τ) = k
= rh−1∑
k=0
e−λ1PbaTw
(λ1PbaTw)
k
k!
.
Evaluating the first order derivative on Pd with respect to rh, Tw and λ1Pba respectively, one can easily
obtain the monotonous property of Pd.
Proof of Theorem 4.3: Let Ĝs=
∑∞
τ=0 δ
τuN(τ). Then Ĝs is a random variable and Gs=E[Ĝs]. Based
on whether a seller ramps up or not, we divide E[Ĝs] into two parts, i.e.,
E[Ĝs] =Pr[Tr > Tw]E[Ĝs|Tr > Tw]
+ Pr[Tr ≤ Tw]E[Ĝs|Tr ≤ Tw]
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We next derive the above two terms individually.
We first derive Pr[Tr > Tw]E[Ĝs|Tr > Tw]. Note that each new seller advertise product quality honestly.
Hence each transaction earns one positive feedback. Recall that Tw/d ∈ N. Note that at time slot Tw/d
a seller drops out, i.e., there will be no transactions from time slot Tw/d. Let K denote the number of
transactions arriving within time slot 0 to Tw/d − 1. Then K satisfies 0 ≤ K ≤ rh − 1 since we are given
Tr > Tw. Note that K = k, where k ≤ rh − 1 implies that Tr > Tw and K is of a value larger than rh − 1
implies that Tr ≤ Tw. Then we have
Pr[Tr > Tw]E[Ĝs|Tr > Tw]
=
∑rh−1
k=0
Pr [K = k, Tr > Tw]E[Ĝs|Tr > Tw,K = k]
=
∑rh−1
k=0
Pr [K = k]E[Ĝs|K = k].
Observe that K =
∑Tw/d−1
τ=0 N(τ) is a random variable which follows a Poisson distribution with parameter
λ1PbaTw. We then have
Pr[Tr > Tw]E[Ĝs|Tr > Tw]
=
rh−1∑
k=0
e−λ1PbaTw
(λ1PbaTw)
k
k!
E[Ĝs|K = k].
We next derive E[Ĝs|K = k]. Let t1, . . . , tK denote the arrival time of transaction 1, . . . ,K. Then t1, . . . , tK
satisfy 0 < t1 < . . . < tK < Tw. Let f(t1, . . . , tk|K = k) denote the probability density function of t1, . . . , tk
given that K = k. By applying Lemma 7.1, we obtain that f(t1, . . . , tk|K = k) = k!/(Tw)
k. Then we have
E[Ĝs|K = k]
=
∫
. . .
∫
0<t1<...<tk<Tw
f(t1, . . . , tk|K = k)E[Ĝs|t1, . . . , tk]
dt1 . . . dtk
=
∫
. . .
∫
0<t1<...<tk<Tw
k!
T kw
k∑
j=1
uδ⌈tj/d⌉dt1 . . . dtk,
where the first step follows that given t1, . . . , tk is equivalent to given K = k. The second step follows that
the payment of transaction 1 ≤ j ≤ k is forwarded to the seller in time slot ⌈tj/d⌉ because of the shipment
delay. Namely, in computing of the long term profit gains, the j-th transaction results in a discounted profit
gain of uδ⌈tj/d⌉. Hence E[Ĝs|t1, . . . , tk] =
∑k
j=1 uδ
⌈tj/d⌉. Combining them all, we have
Pr[Tr > Tw]E[Ĝs|Tr > Tw] =
rh−1∑
k=0
e−λ1PbaTw
(λ1PbaTw)
k
k!∫
. . .
∫
0<t1<...<tk<Tw
k!
T kw
k∑
j=1
uδ⌈tj/d⌉dt1 . . . dtk.
We now derive Pr[Tr ≤ Tw]E[Ĝs|Tr ≤ Tw]. Let trh denote the arrival time of the rh-th transaction.
Based on our reputation updating rule specified in Equation (2), we obtain that trh < Tw implies Tr ≤ Tw.
Note that trh is a random variable. Let f(trh) denote the probability density function of trh . Observe
that Pr[trh ≤ t] =
∑∞
k=rh
e−λ1Pbat(λ1Pbat)
k/k!. Performing the first order derivative on this term, we have
f(trh)=λ1Pbae
−λ1Pbatrh (λ1Pbatrh)
rh−1/(rh − 1)!. Then it follows that
Pr[Tr≤Tw]E[Ĝs|Tr≤Tw]=
∫ Tw
0
f(trh)E[Ĝs|trh ]dtrh
=
∫ Tw
0
λ1Pbae
−λ1Pbatrh
(λ1Pbatrh)
rh−1
(rh − 1)!
E[Ĝs|trh ]dtrh .
We next derive E[Ĝs|trh ]. Let t1, . . . , trh−1 denote the arrival time of the 1-st,. . . , (rh − 1)-th transaction.
Let f(t1, . . . , trh−1|trh) denote the probability density function of t1, . . . , trh−1 given trh . Then applying
15
Lemma 7.1, we obtain that f(t1, . . . , trh−1|trh) = (rh − 1)!/(trh)
rh−1. Then it follows that
E[Ĝs|trh ] =
∫
. . .
∫
0<t1<...<trh−1<trh
f(t1, . . . , trh−1|trh)
E[Ĝs|t1, . . . , trh−1, trh ]dt1 . . . dtrh−1
=
∫
. . .
∫
0<t1<...<trh−1<trh
(rh − 1)!
(trh)
rh−1
u
( rh∑
j=1
δ⌈tj/d⌉ + δ⌈trh/d⌉
λ1Pba(d⌈trh/d⌉ − trh)+λ2Pbrd
δ⌈trh/d⌉+1
1− δ
)
dt1 . . . dtrh−1.
We elaborate more on computing E[Ĝs|t1, . . . , trh−1, trh ]. The transactions arriving within time 0 to time
trh contribute
∑rh
j=1 uδ
⌈tj/d⌉ to the long term profit gains. Consider the transactions arriving within time
trh to d⌈trh/d⌉. This time interval belongs to time slot ⌊trh/d⌋. Note that in this time slot the reputation
score is lower than rh. This means that the number of transactions arriving in this time interval follows a
Poisson distribution with parameter λ1Pba(d⌈trh/d⌉− trh). In expectation, transactions arriving in this time
interval contribute δ⌈trh/d⌉λ1Pba(d⌈trh/d⌉ − trh)u. Consider transactions arriving from time slots ⌈trh/d⌉ to
∞. In these time slots, a seller’s reputation satisfies the condition to be labeled as reputable. The number of
transactions arriving in each of these time slots follows a Poisson distribution with parameter λ2Pbrd. These
transactions, in expectation, contribute uλ2Pbrd
δ⌈trh/d⌉+1
1−δ in total. Summing these terms together we obtain
E[Ĝs|t1, . . . , trh−1, trh ]. We have
Pr[Tr≤Tw]E[Ĝs|Tr≤Tw]
=
∫ Tw
0
λ1Pbae
−λ1Pbatrh
(λ1Pbatrh)
rh−1
(rh − 1)!
dtrh∫
. . .
∫
0<t1<...<trh−1<trh
(rh − 1)!
(trh)
rh−1
u
( rh∑
j=1
δ⌈tj/d⌉ +
δ⌈trh/d⌉+1
1− δ
λ2Pbrd+ δ
⌈trh/d⌉λ1Pba(d⌈trh/d⌉ − trh)
)
dt1 . . . dtrh−1
Combing them all, we prove this theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5.1: We first derive E[T Ir ] and P
I
d . Note that sellers advertise honestly. This means that
all transactions result in positive feedbacks. This implies that the insurance certificate expires at the end of
the duration time. Note thatN(ℓ), the number of transactions at time slot ℓ=0, 1, . . . ,∞ before a seller ramps
up, follows a Poisson distribution, and we denote its parameter by λ˜T (ℓ). Applying Equation (9), we have
λ˜T (ℓ)=λ2Pbrd for all ℓ=0, 1, . . . , ⌊Td/d⌋−1, and λ˜T (⌊Td/d⌋)=λ2Pbr(Td−d⌊Td/d⌋)+λ1Pba(d⌊Td/d⌋+d−Td),
and λ˜T (ℓ)=λ1Pbad for all ℓ= ⌊Td/d⌋+ 1, . . . ,∞. Then with a similar derivation as Theorem 4.1 we obtain
the expected ramp up time E[T Ir ]. Furthermore, with a similar derivation as Theorem 4.2 we obtain P
I
d .
Let us now derive long term profit gains (Gs) and average per seller transaction gains (Ge). We derive
Gs first. Let Ĝ
I
s =
∑∞
τ=0 δ
τuN I(τ), where N I(τ) denotes the number of transactions arriving in time slot
τ when a seller subscribes to an insurance. Then ĜIs is a random variable and G
I
s =E[Ĝ
I
s]. With a similar
derivation as Theorem 4.3, we have
E[ĜIs ] =Pr[T
I
r > Tw]E[Ĝ
I
s |T
I
r > Tw]
+ Pr[T Ir ≤ Tw]E[Ĝ
I
s|T
I
r ≤ Tw]
Let λ̂T (t) denote the transaction’s arrival rate at time t[0,∞). Applying Equation (9), we have two cases:
(1) a seller ramps up (T Ir ≤ Tw), then we have λ̂T (t)=λ2Pbr for all t ∈ [0,min{Tw, Td}], λ̂T (t)=λ1Pba for all
t ∈ [Td, T
I
r ], and λ̂T (t)=λ2Pbr for all t ∈ [T
I
r ,∞]; (2) a seller drops out (T
I
r > Tw), then we have λ̂T (t)=λ2Pbr
for all t ∈ [0,min{Tw, Td}], λ̂T (t) =λ1Pba for all t ∈ [Td, Tw], and λ̂T (t) = 0 for all t ∈ [Tw,∞]. With these
observations and using a similar derivation as Theorem 4.3, one can easily obtain analytical expressions for
the term Pr[T Ir > Tw]E[Ĝ
I
s |T
I
r > Tw] and the term Pr[T
I
r ≤ Tw]E[Ĝ
I
s |T
I
r ≤ Tw] respectively. Combing them
all we complete this theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5.2: We want to derive the reasonable price that an E-Commerce operator can charge for
the insurance. The marginal long term profit gain of an insured seller is GIs−CI . Note that the marginal long
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term profit gain without insurance is Gs. Thus sellers has the incentive to buy an insurance if the marginal
profit gain corresponds to buying an insurance is larger than the marginal profit gain without insurance, i.e.,
GIs − CI>Gs, which yields CI<G
I
s −Gs.
Note that sellers advertise honestly. Let N ′(Td) denote the total number of products sold in insurance
duration time. It is easy to see that N ′(Td) follows a Poisson distribution with parameter λ2PbrTd. The
worst case is that all buyers hold the product till the last minute of the clearing time Tc and then return it.
Using a Chernoof bound [18] argument, one can easily bound the shipment cost (at the worst case) as
Pr[N ′(Td)CS ≥ N
′CS ] ≤ e
−λ2PbrTd(eλ2PbrTd)
N ′/N ′N
′
Setting N ′ = max{ln ǫ−1 − λ2PbrTd, e
2λ2PbrTd} we have Pr[N
′(Td)CS ≥ N
′CS ] ≤ ǫ. The clearing time
follows the shipment delay d.
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